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Most models exploring the relationship between income inequality and economic growth postulate the existence of
a negative correlation between the two operating through diverse channels. Parallel to the theoretical models a number
of empirical studies have attempted to appraise this relationship. A broad consensus had built validating the
existence of  such negative correlation until some panel data studies tended to show the opposite result. The review of
the ensuing debate as well as the empirical estimation undertook in this paper show that estimates may not be as
robust as believed. It is suggested that country case studies may be a way to more appropriately explore this issue.
Keywords: Income Distribution, Growth, Panel Data Econometrics, Multiregional
JEL codes: O150, O500
RESUMEN
La mayoría de los modelos que exploran la relación entre la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso y el
crecimiento económico, postulan la existencia de una correlación negativa entre las dos que es generada a través de
diferentes mecanismos. Paralelamente a los modelos teóricos, un número importante de estudios empíricos han
tratado de evaluar esta relación. De este esfuerzo ha surgido un consenso amplio que valida la existencia de dicha
relación negativa. No obstante, estudios recientes basados en el uso de datos de panel han producido el resultado
contrario, documentando la presencia de una relación positiva entre desigualdad y crecimiento. El examen del
debate generado a partir de estos resultados, así como el trabajo empírico adelantado en este estudio, indican que
las estimaciones obtenidas en diversos trabajos pueden no ser tan robustas como se creía En consecuencia, se
sugiere que la realización de estudios de caso por país puede ser una mejor vía para explorar este tema.
Keywords:Distribucion del ingreso, crecimiento, econometria de datos de panel
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1. INTRODUCTION
A copious literature on the relationship between income distribution and economic growth has
developed recently and particularly during the 1990s. Among this literature an important branch
has focused on developing theoretical models to posit and explore a causal relationship that,
contrary to the traditional Kuznets’ curve literature, goes from inequality to growth. Most of
these models put forward the existence of a negative correlation between inequality and growth
that operates through a myriad of mechanisms. In a related effort a number of studies have
attempted to empirically estimate this relationship by means of different modeling approaches. A
broad consensus validating the existence of this negative correlation prevailed until some authors
began using panel data estimation techniques that have tended to show a positive correlation.
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between inequality and growth
in light of recent developments. For this, first a broad overview of the literature in the area is
conducted, at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Section 2 provides such a review, focus-
ing on the rationale of the theoretical models and some of their variants, and includes a sum-
mary of the empirical studies, their methods, and results. In section 3 the motivation for providing
a new empirical estimate is presented. The results of this empirical estimation are reported and
discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes with some comments.
2. THE RENEWED INTEREST IN INEQUALITY
Kanbur & Lustig (2000) examine the reasons why during the 1990s inequality was brought
back on the development economics and economic growth agenda. They found five main mo-
tives for this: (a) the debate on the separation of efficiency and equity, (b) the significance of
the Kuznets’ curve, (c) the noticeable changes in income distribution across countries between
the 1980s and 1990s, (d) the changing income distribution patterns experienced within coun-
tries and hidden below stable national inequality indices, and (e) the issue of inequality be-
tween countries.
Since the appearance of Kuznets’ inverted U hypothesis on the relationship between in-
equality and economic growth empirical work has shown diverging results about its validity.
Doubts have been particularly strong regarding the persistence of this relationship for a country
over time. However, even though evidence from work based upon endogenous growth theory
is mixed as to what the nature of the relationship between inequality and growth is, it points
out with no qualification in the direction of questioning the independence between the two.
The move toward increased inequality within countries has spurred an ample set of explana-
tions ranging from potential distributional effects from globalization, to government policies and
social norms. The increase in inequality between countries experienced since the 1980s has moti-
vated a large body of literature that has helped put inequality back on the agenda. Clearly, one of
the issues is convergence. Other set of issues refers to the seemingly difficulty of some countries
to break the low-income trap while others manage to do so and the consequent quest for the
reasons for this as well as for policy recipes to achieve this jump. In examining this theme, the
connection between inequality and long-term growth has provided a fruitful area of research.RICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 5
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2.1 THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY ON GROWTH
An interesting body of literature mainly based upon endogenous growth theory has been
developed from the 1990s. It has become common to classify these theories into categories
according to the mechanism that links inequality and growth. The classification in use here
comprises the following: credit market imperfections, political economy, political economy and
credit market imperfections, and social unrest.1
CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
Models featuring credit market imperfections are based upon the assumption that a limited
capacity to borrow on the part of certain economic agents, leads to rates of return on invest-
ment opportunities that do not necessarily equate in the margin. As credit access is limited, the
possibility of exploiting investment opportunities depends on the individual’s possession of
assets and income. Perotti (1992) uses the loan-to-value ratio for domestic mortgages as a
proxy for credit availability, finding that it has a positive effect on the growth rate and that as
inequality increases the impact of credit availability on growth becomes larger.
Galor & Zeira (1993) pioneered in showing the link between credit market imperfections,
income and wealth distribution, and aggregate investment in human capital. Following their work,
a number of studies indicate that in spite of the fact that education shows high rates of return,
poor people tend to forego investing in education due to their inability to borrow and that this, in
turn, slows the formation of human capital and lower growth rates. An important issue is
intergenerational mobility as the presence of fixed costs of investment on education may prevent
a dynasty that lacks resources at the beginning from doing this type of investment generation after
generation. Examples of this literature are provided by Benabou (1996a), and Piketty (1996).
In a general sense, given the presence of decreasing returns, a more equal distribution of in-
come could raise the average productivity of investment and hence foster growth. In some models
such as in Perotti (1993), and Saint-Paul & Verdier (1993) the beneficial effects that redistributive
policies may have on growth have been highlighted. If in contrast, increasing returns on invest-
ment prevail for some range (for example, education yields higher returns only after certain school-
ing level) inequality may be positively related to growth as it allows that some individuals get
through this threshold. A result posited in Aghion & Bolton (1997) and Perotti (1993).
POLITICAL ECONOMY
The political economy argument refers to social preference for redistributive taxation. When
mean income exceeds the median income in an economy, majority voting tends to favor taxa-
1 Apart from the models included in these categories there are two other perspectives that are worth brief mention-
ing. One has to do with the idea that individual saving rates increase with income level and that a higher concentra-
tion of income would make possible the presence of higher saving rates and investment and therefore growth.
The other relates to the interaction between education and fertility decisions on the part of individuals, which are
brought about by the interplay between the direct cost of raising children and the opportunity cost of the parent’s
human capital. Redistribution of human capital favoring individuals with lower levels of it would increase enroll-
ment ratios and decrease fertility. Establishing a negative relationship between equality and fertility and a positive
one between equality and investment in human capital and hence growth.6 REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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tion (provided it is progressive) and government redistributive spending either as direct trans-
fers or as public expenditure programs. This provides the political mechanism for the connec-
tion between inequality and growth. On the other hand, higher taxes and transfers distort
economic decisions and disincentive private savings and investment causing economic growth
to decline. This constitutes the economic mechanism of the linkage. As a consequence, the
existence of high inequality is considered a cause of slow growth via its effect on taxation and
redistribution through the political system.
Perotti (1996) finds an expected positive relation between inequality and taxation but an
unexpected positive relation between marginal taxation and growth. This is consistent with
results from other studies, such as Easterly & Rebelo (1993) who find that redistribution has a
positive impact on growth. Alesina & Rodrik (1994) directly model productive government
expenditure. Even though in this case there is need to consider the trade-off between the
distortionary effects of taxation versus the positive effects of public investment, they maintain
that inequality affects taxation through the political process and indirectly impinge upon growth
as redistribution disincentive investment and growth. Therefore, more equal societies must
tend to grow faster. In fact, the relationship inequality-growth within this perspective may prove
tricky, as Barro (1999) has noticed with respect to the implications of whether income inequal-
ity is measured ex-ante or ex-post.
The form of political power may matter. In a one person-one vote democracy context, Persson
& Tabellini (1994) claim that the negative effect of inequality on growth should be stronger in
democracies than in non-democracies. However, results from other studies are mixed and tend
to find either consistent but not significant or inconsistent parameter estimates (see Alesina &
Rodrik (1994), and Perotti (1996)). Benabou (1996b) builds a model that allows for deviations
from the one-person-one-vote rule in a specific direction: the political system can lean towards
a positive or negative wealth bias. Therefore, what matters for growth is not the extent to which
the political system deviates from perfect democracy but whose interests are favored or cur-
tailed by this deviation. It turns out then that the distribution of political power matters too.
POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPOUNDED WITH CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
The main issue within this class of models is redistribution and its effects on growth. In a
strict sense, the credit market imperfections models do not comprise a political economy com-
ponent, that is, policy is exogenous. On the other hand, complete markets characterize “pure”
political economy models. In general, countries face a tradeoff between the benefits of redistri-
bution and its costs and both forces must be accounted for. This is precisely what political
economy/credit market imperfections models attempt to do.
In Benabou (1996b), under any given policy, inequality reduces growth and intertemporal effi-
ciency while growth is first increasing on redistribution and then decreasing, regardless of the
level of initial inequality. Aghion, Caroli & Garcia-Penalosa (1999) directly address the issue of
redistribution. With heterogeneous agents, highly imperfect capital markets, and technology ex-
hibiting diminishing returns to capital, inequality has a negative impact on growth and redistribu-
tion a positive one. Redistribution acts through three routes. First, it has an opportunity-enhancing
effect as wealth is transferred from the rich to the poor whose marginal productivity of invest-RICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 7
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ment is high but cannot invest due to their limited endowments. Second, there is a positive effect
of redistribution on incentives as it makes individual agents decrease the share of debt in financ-
ing their projects. Third, redistribution can help decrease macroeconomic volatility.
A connection between inequality and growth that has been explored by Haussmann & Gavin
(1996), Ramey & Ramey (1995), and Alesina & Perotti (1996) is that inequality generates macro-
economic volatility and lowers growth. Unequal access to investment opportunities, jointly with
a high degree of capital market imperfection generates credit cycles and macroeconomic volatil-
ity. By increasing the share of savers that can directly invest in high return projects or by transfer-
ring idle funds from savers to investors volatility would decrease and growth would be enhanced.
A more complex political economy-credit/insurance market imperfections model linking in-
equality and the social contract (the structure and working of redistributive policies) is provided
in Benabou (2000). In this case, popular support for redistributive policies decreases with inequal-
ity over some range. Efficient redistribution has a wide consensus in a fairly homogeneous society
and face strong opposition in a more unequal one. Below a threshold level no allocation of politi-
cal power can lead to more than a unique social contract, whereas above it there may be multiple
steady states. Therefore no unique relationship necessarily arises between inequality and growth
and differing empirical results may be in fact non-comparable or be indicative of differing steady
state equilibriums that bear weak or no linkage to economic performance.
SOCIAL UNREST
The basis for the sociopolitical instability approach found in studies by Alesina & Perotti
(1996) and Gupta (1990), among others, is that inequality of income and wealth may create
incentives for people to engage in activities outside the socially accepted channels of political
representation or social action. This form of rent-seeking behavior is wasteful as are the defen-
sive efforts of the potential victims. Furthermore, social unrest discourages investment as it
generates uncertainty and disrupts the normal functioning of markets and labor relations. As a
consequence, economic growth declines.
Theoretical models of this view comprise work by Benhabib & Rustichini (1996), and
Grossman & Kim (1996).2 Most of these models focus on the allocation of resources among
productive, predatory, and defensive activities in the context of one-time interactions between
individuals or social classes. Benabou (1996b) synthesizes the basics of this class of models by
means of an economic growth version of the prisoner’s dilemma. The model shows that, as in
the case of the political economy models, what seems to matter is not inequality per se but the
relative distribution of income and political power.
As pointed out by Barro (1999), transfers of economic resources may be an offsetting force
in this context. As the poor need some resource level to effectively be able to disrupt the
regime, income equalizing transfers promote stability only to the extent that they can overcome
the tendency towards rebellious behavior. Even though it appears to be ample empirical evi-
dence in favor of this perspective, the specific channels through which it operates are not
2 There is multiplicity of studies on the property rights and economic growth linkage that, however, does not
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entirely clear. As Benabou (1996b) points out it seem to be the “general idea” that political
instability negatively affects growth what the evidence supports rather than the particular link-
ages that models portray.
2.2 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Due in part to the theoretical origin that most of the research in this area has and to the
nature of the available data, most empirical work on this issue is based upon a variation of
Barro (1991) and Barro & Sala-I-Martin (1995) cross-country economic growth estimation.
Limited work, most notably that by Barro (1999), has taken a simultaneous equations perspec-
tive. The usual cross-section estimation regresses a measure of economic growth or investment
growth on a set of variables deemed as standard in estimating growth models, to which a
measure of income inequality is added. Most of the results of this reduced-form estimation
indicate a negative relationship between inequality and growth, although a number of qualifi-
cations usually apply to them.
As reduced-form estimates are compatible with several theoretical explanations of the
linkage inequality-growth, they cannot provide information on the specific channels through
which this relationship takes place and therefore only structural models may supply evi-
dence on them. However, as mentioned, few empirical works have attempted to do so.
Perotti (1996) provides such type of evidence for four types of models, finding that the
socio-political instability and the education/fertility joint decision approaches attain the
strongest support, while the credit market imperfections (linked to human capital invest-
ment) approach finds support but suffers from potential measurement error giving the exist-
ing data. On the other hand, the political economy approach appears to command the weakest
empirical support.
One of the problems associated with cross-section estimations is measurement error in in-
come inequality data. Detailed discussion of this type of data difficulties is provided in Perotti
(1996), Deininger & Squire (1996), and Forbes (2000). Recently, the Deininger & Squire (1996)
data set has become the most common source for income inequality data. They assembled a
relatively large and consistent data set and classified the data points according to its seeming
quality level. Forbes (2000) notes that a majority of the data employed in some of the most
well-known cross-section studies does not qualify as high quality data, a situation that she
considers may lead to biased estimated coefficients. There is discussion however, on the extent
to which data selection based upon the criteria used by Deininger and Squire should be re-
garded as definitive.3 Atkinson & Brandolini (1999) content that all available measurements of
inequality are imperfect an that data considered as low quality by Deininger and Squire reflect
actual movements of income inequality for a sub-sample of OECD countries and therefore
provide valuable information.
3 They applied three basic quality standards: that information must come from household surveys, that these
surveys must be representative of the whole country, and that the measure of income or expenditure must be
comprehensive.RICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 9
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A set of 12 studies that have attempted to empirically measure the relationship between
inequality and growth were examined.4 They use samples that range from nine to 119 countries
covering diverse time periods. Seven studies employ cross-section estimations, two use pooled
time series-cross section, four use simultaneous equations estimation techniques, one uses panel
data estimation, and one uses nonparametric methods.5 Results from the majority of these
models indicate that there is indeed a negative relationship between inequality at an initial
point in time and the per capita long-term rate of growth.
Typically, the growth rate measured over a long period of time (20 to 30 years) is regressed
on a set of variables that is a slight variation of Barro’s (1991) growth regression, to which
others are added (the so called Barro-augmented regression) for obtaining a new estimation.6
All explanatory variables, including income inequality are measured at a time as close as pos-
sible to the beginning of the time period for which the growth rate has been measured, in order
to avoid endogeneity and ‘ensure causation’. The results tend to be robust to different specifi-
cations of the models and ways of measuring inequality, but are frequently found to moderately
vary in magnitude and lose significance when regional dummy variables are included. This has
been interpreted as a consequence of well known historic regional differences in inequality and
as an indication of the existence of non-included variables of regional importance that have
some correlation with inequality and actually influence the growth rate.
In spite of the relatively large consensus on the empirical verification of this negative relation-
ship, a handful of studies have recently ‘challenged’ this view. Barro (1999) finds weak overall
effects of inequality on growth and investment, and reports that the negative effect of inequality on
growth that he finds for low-income countries switches to a positive effect for high-income coun-
tries. Li & Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) report econometric results showing a positive association.
In the light of these findings, especially that of Forbes, a debate has resurfaced around the issue.
3. MOTIVATION FOR A NEW EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
As follows from the Appendix, the immediate reasons for the differing result of Forbes lie in
the fact that hers (as is Li and Zou’s) is a fixed-effects model yielding estimates that should be
understood as a measure of how changes in inequality relate to changes in growth within a given
country instead of across countries (as regular cross-section studies do). Also, the time period
break of 5 years that she uses to build the unbalanced panel data on which the estimation is
done, makes the coefficients short to medium run in nature instead of long run indicators as is
usual in other studies. For these reasons, Forbes considers that these results do not necessarily
contradict other studies’. While currently there is no sufficient data to estimate a long run fixed-
effects relationship between inequality and growth, it is possible to think of theoretical chan-
nels that in the long run may hamper or even reverse this positive relationship.
4 Easterly & Rebelo (1993), Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Persson & Tabellini (1994), Birdsall, Ross & Sabot (1995),
Clarke (1995), Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), Deininger & Squire (1998), Barro (1999), Forbes (2000),
Banerjee & Duflo (2000b), and Easterly (2001)
 5 Several studies estimate more than one type of model, so the number of models does not coincide with the
number of studies referenced.
6 Typically the Barro-type variables include initial GDP per capita, primary school enrollment or attainment, second-
ary school enrolment or attainment, and a measure of market distortions.10 REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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Besides this, Forbes argues that, contrary to what is commonly claimed, most estimates lack
robustness and that the drop in significance that the inequality coefficient suffers when regional
dummies are included in the models shows this fact. Furthermore, two econometric problems
potentially affect the quality of most studies. First, as mentioned before, is the issue of measure-
ment error in inequality. The development of the Deininger & Squire (1996) database has pro-
vided a vast improvement in data quality but measurement error continues nonetheless to be of
consideration. Second, the omitted-variable bias is a potentially important problem in the context
of these studies. The particular relation between inequality and growth that is found in a country
may be due to the effect of variables that are not included in the model. In other words, there is a
strong possibility that “unobserved” characteristics of a country determine to a large extent either
the degree of inequality or the growth rate or both but are not explicitly accounted for in the model.
There are two possibilities for taking into account the “unobserved” characteristics of a coun-
try: one is to consider them to be invariant along time (the fixed-effects approach); the other is to
view them as varying according to a certain probability distribution (the random-effects approach).
Interestingly, as noted, the two studies that have recently found positive associations between
inequality and growth were estimated by using some variant of the fixed-effects approach. Forbes
(2000) notes how data quality, period length, and estimation technique influence the sign and
significance of the coefficient for inequality for the same specification of the model.
Aghion, Caroli & Garcia-Penalosa (1999), have criticized Forbes’ results in three directions.
First, on econometric grounds, arguing that the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (used by Forbes)
may have significance problems; second, considering that the five-year break period used for
constructing the panel data is ad-hoc; third, in Forbes’ need to restrict the data to the high-
quality data of the Deinigner & Squire (1996) dataset. More recently, Banerjee & Duflo (2000a,
b) have made an extensive critique of Forbes’ estimates. According to them, there are theoreti-
cal and empirical reasons to believe that in the short-run both increases and decreases in in-
equality are followed by a reduction in the growth rate. That is, there exists a U-shaped relationship
between changes in inequality (in any direction) and changes in the growth rate. The direction
of this relationship (i.e. whether or not it is U-shaped or inverted-U-shaped) depends upon
model parameters. As a consequence, they consider that Forbes’ estimate extrapolates this rela-
tionship by means of the linear structure that she imposes on her model.
In what follows I generate a new estimation of the relationship between inequality and
growth by using a panel data model that tries to take into account some of the just mentioned
criticisms of Forbes’ model.
3.1. THE MODEL AND THE DATA
A commonly used model specification is employed for estimating the relationship between
inequality and growth. The basic model can be described as follows:
(y it+a – y it) / a = β X it-1 + u it (1)
where yit represents the logarithm of per capita GNP in country i at time t (therefore the left
hand side is the growth rate); a is the length of time chosen to break the panel periods; Xit-1 is aRICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 11
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set of control variables whose values belong to the preceding time period for the year that is
closest to the beginning of the current period; and uit is a time varying error term.
The set of control variables comprises the logarithm of per capita GNP (Incomeit-1), the
Gini coefficient (Giniit-1), a measure of market distortions (PPPIit-1), average secondary school
attainment for the female population aged over 25 (Feducit-1), and average secondary school
attainment for the male population aged over 25 (Meducit-1). Given the short to medium term
nature of the panel data sets used to estimate the model (five-year and ten-year breaks) per
capita GNP was averaged over five-year periods to smooth out possible yearly serial correlation
from business cycles. As usual in these models, income level controls for convergence effects.
The PPP price of investment deflated by the exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar is used as
the measure of market distortions. Educational attainment is meant to proxy for the level of
human capital available and is preferred to enrollment since it is a stock variable. The purpose
of using stock variables measured at the start of the time breaks, rather than flow variables
measured throughout the periods is to reduce potential endogeneity.
Table 1 summarizes the definition of the variables employed, indicates the data sources, and
provides basic statistics for them. The data set basically employed for estimation includes 52
countries and 225 observations distributed along 7 five-year periods covering from 1960 to
1995. Table 1.A. presents the list of countries included, the number of observations available
per country and the time period covered by them. Following Barro (1999), the data for the Gini
coefficients includes, besides the “high quality” data, the observations that are not considered
“high quality” by Deininger and Squire due to lack of a clear reference to their source. This
allows expanding the database used by Forbes without major loss in comparability.
TABLE 1
VARIABLE DEFINITION, SOURCE, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (1960-1990)
Variable Description  Source  Mean Std  Dev Minimum Maximum 
Growth  Real average per cap-ita 
income growth 
Calculated from data 
below 
0.0108 0.0104 -0.0218  0.0409 
Income  Log of real GNP per 
capita at US$ 95 * 
World Bank 2001 **  3.5057  0.6540  2.1981  4.5864 
Gini  Gini coefficient ***  Deininger & Squire 2000  42.016  9.1683  20.970  68.00 
PPPI  Price level of invest-ment 
at PPP/exchange rate 
relative to the US 
Penn World Tables (v.5.6)  80.033  35.5512  30.940  384.860 
Feduc  Average years of sec-
ondary schooling; female 
population aged over 25 
Barro & Lee 2000  1.2348  1.0787  0.0240  5.1060 
Meduc  Average years of sec-
ondary schooling; male 
population aged over 25 
Barro & Lee 2000  1.5894  1.0852  0.1700  5.0680 
* GNP was averaged over five year periods to smooth cyclical business fluctuations.
** An alternative data set uses Penn World Tables v. 5.6 as the income source.
*** When based on expenditures, the Gini coefficient was adjusted to income measure (adding 6.6 as in Deininger &
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Since the purpose of the estimations to be presented is to make a comparison with Forbes’
results, no attempt is made to experiment with the set of control variables. In the same vein,
and in spite of the suggestion about the inconvenience of adjusting the Gini coefficients
[Atkinson & Brandolini (1999)], in the cases in which they are based in expenditure rather than
in income they were adjusted as suggested by Deininger & Squire (1996) by adding 6.6. This
was done on the idea of preserving comparability. Also, for doing sensibility analysis of the
results no other measures of inequality were considered since it would have implied an imprac-
ticable reduction in the size of the database. Instead, three additional databases were con-
structed to generate alternative estimations. One using income data from the World Bank (2001)
but employing ten-year breaks to build the panel (as in Barro’s (1999) database). The other two
are based on income data from the Penn World Tables (real per capita GNP at US$ 1987),
covering the period 1960-1990. Of these, one is broken in five-year periods and the other in
ten-year periods.
3.2 ESTIMATION
Estimation is made by means of the standard panel techniques: fixed effects and random
effects. In these, the model is assumed to have the structure presented in equation (1) but the
error term is broken down into a time invariant country-specific component and a time variant
error term with the usual properties, as shown in equation (2) below. Contrary to the random
effects, the fixed effects estimation assumes that the time invariant country-specific variable vi
is non random. Consequently, the coefficients must be interpreted as marginal changes within a
given country rather than across countries as the random effects estimation yields. Estimation
using the error term specification in equation (2) is also known as one-way effects (either fixed
or random). An alternative specification, allowing for time specific effects is shown in equation
(3) and provides the basis for the two-way effects estimation. In both cases the error term (eit)
is assumed to be orthogonal to the other variables and vi is assumed to have zero mean, con-
stant variance, and zero covariance with the vi corresponding to other countries. In equation
(3), in addition, it is assumed that the period effect (et) has zero mean, constant variance, zero
covariance with the et belonging to different time periods, and orthogonality with respect to vi.
uit = vi + εit  (2)
u it = v i + e t + ε it (3)
The model in equation (1) is then estimated using four different procedures: one-way fixed
effects, two-way fixed effects, one-way random effects, and two-way random effects. The model
with the basic set of control variables is appended with regional dummies for Latin America
(Lad), Asia (Asd), and Africa (Afd), and with a dummy (Iup) that takes on value 1 if the Gini
coefficient has increased from the previous to the current cross-section. The regional dummies
allow controlling for the usual sensitivity found on the coefficient corresponding to inequality
in other studies and the increased-inequality dummy (Iup) is used to test the U-shaped relation-
ship postulated by Banerjee & Duflo (2000a, b).RICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 13
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4. RESULTS
To test the data, a cross-section estimation of the model in equation (1) is performed for
1980, which provides the largest cross-sectional sample. As shown in Table 2, the results from
this regression are quite consistent with what has been found in the literature. The first column
of the table indicates that the basic set of control variables yields a negative and significant
effect of inequality o growth, while the second makes it evident that the level and significance
of this coefficient is sensible to the introduction of regional dummies.
For a necessarily smaller sub-sample, in the third column the increased-inequality dummy (Iup) is
added to the basic model with the consequence that its inclusion lowers the level and significance of
the coefficient for the Gini in a higher proportion than the regional dummies do. This is an indication
of the importance of considering movements in the level of inequality in this type of model. Inter-
estingly, the increased-inequality dummy shows a positive and significant relationship with growth.
If the Gini is dropped (fourth column), the level and significance of the increased-inequality dummy
augment implying that the Gini still captures some effects of inequality on growth and that both
variables should belong to the model. Finally, in the fifth and sixth columns the regional dummies
are added again and as a consequence, the level and significance of the increased-inequality dummy
fall. This result may indicate that nonetheless the increased-inequality dummy plays an interesting
role in the model, it is not immune to the effect of other forces that are captured via the regional
dummies; i.e. as in the case of the Gini, its explanatory power is not so high as to remain significant.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS: ESTIMATES FOR THE 1980 CROSS-SECTION













































































Lad   -0.0035 
(-0.83) 




Asd   0.0136 
(3.62) 




Afd   0.0112 
(1.84) 




Obvs. 41  41  34  34  34  34 
R2 0.51  0.73  0.55  0.51  0.82  0.82 
Dependent variable: average real per capita GNP growth; t-statistics in parentheses14 REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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Table 3 Reports panel estimates for different model specifications under various estimation
techniques. Unlike what was done for the 1980 cross-section, here only two specifications of
the model could be used. Given the size of the dataset, inclusion of the regional dummies
makes the system unfeasible to solve. The table includes results from all estimation techniques
that passed the corresponding specification tests. It should be noted that only one random
effects specification passed the test (a Hausman test in this case). This implies that, overall, the
variation in the model should be attributed to within country variation and that cross-country
variation has limited capability to render significant estimates.
TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS: ALTERNATIVE PANEL ESTIMATIONS










































































































#  Ctries.  52  52  52 46 46 46 46 
Obvs.  225  225  225 179 179 179 179 
R2  0.67  0.13  0.69 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.71 
 
Dependent variable: average real per capita GNP growth; t-statistics in parentheses
Five-year panel, 1960-1995
The one-way-fixed effects estimation of the basic model shows a positive and significant
correlation between inequality and growth giving support to Forbes’ results. However, when
the same model is estimated using one-way-random effects and two-way-fixed effects, the level
of significance of the coefficient drops. When the increased-inequality dummy is included in
the model, the significance of the coefficient on the Gini drops but, unlike what happens in the
cross-section showed before, its value increases in one case (column 4) and stays constant in
the other (column 6). Contrary to what happens in the cross-section case, the increased-in-
equality dummy is never significant in the panel estimation and its sign switches depending on
whether or not the Gini is included in the regression.RICARDO ARGÜELLO C. 15
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Up to this point, it is not entirely clear that this empirical exercise supports the idea that
inequality and growth are positively correlated. More clearly, it does not appear to support the
proposition that there is an U-shaped relationship between changes in inequality and growth.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS: SENSIBILITY OF THE BASIC RESULTS
TO DIFFERENT DATASETS
Five-year Panel 1960-1990 



































    












#  Ctries.  55  55 44  44  44 44  44 44 
Obvs.  213  213 159  159  159 159  159 159 
R2  0.58  0.63 0.62  0.14  0.63 0.62  0.14 0.63 
Ten-year Panel 1960-1990 
One-Way Two-
Way 
One-Way       Estimat-
ion 



















     




    
#  Ctries. 37 37  37 17 17       
Obvs. 91  91  91  34  34      
R2 0.78  0.21  0.79  0.32  0.29       
Ten-year Panel 1960-1995 








































#  Ctries.  44  44 44  44  30 30  30 30 
Obvs.  128 128  128 128  72 72  72 72 
R2  0.73  0.19 0.74  0.13  0.75 0.74  0.78 0.78 
  Dependent variable: average real per capita GNP growth; t-statistics in parentheses
To further explore the issue and test the sensitivity of the results above, Table 4 presents
estimate values for the coefficients on the Gini and on the increased-inequality dummy ob-16 REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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tained from the ten-year panel and from the two panels that use income data from the Penn
World Tables.
As in the case of the results from the basic dataset, Table 4 reports estimates coming from
all estimation techniques that passed the corresponding specification tests. A first difference to
be noted is that in this case a larger number of models estimated by means of random effects
techniques turned out to be appropriate. However, they tend to produce non-significant coeffi-
cients for the Gini.
Results from fixed effects estimation tend, again, to show a positive and significant correla-
tion between inequality and growth when the basic model is used and the data correspond to
the ten-year breaks datasets. Here, however, the two-way estimation also tends to produce the
same result and non-significant parameter estimates are obtained for the five-year panel. Con-
sistently with what happened in the base case, when the increased-inequality dummy is in-
cluded the significance of the coefficient for the Gini decreases. Nonetheless, its impact on the
level of the coefficient is mixed, rising sometimes, diminishing in other occasions, and even
reversing its sign in others. Finally, in general the coefficient for the increased-inequality dummy
tends to be non-significant. There is, however, a dataset for which it takes positive and signifi-
cant values (it should be noted though that sample size is reduced for both the number of cross-
sections and the number of observations).
In general terms, it can be said that the results arising from the alternate datasets tend to
support those reported for the basic dataset in Table 3. Consequently no overwhelming evi-
dence is found in favor of the existence of a positive correlation between inequality and growth
and basically no support is obtained for the proposition that changes in inequality (in either
direction) and growth have a U-shaped relationship.
5. FINAL COMMENTS
As mentioned, the empirical exploration on the relationship between income inequality and
growth carried out in this paper does not lend broad support for the hypothesis that inequality
is positively correlated with growth. Even more clearly, it does not support the idea that there
exists an U-shaped relationship between changes in inequality and growth. However, and more
importantly, no evidence is found of a negative correlation as has been most commonly pro-
posed in the literature on the topic. If a “conclusion” would be forced out of this exercise, it
would pinpoint that there is virtually no panel estimation evidence here of a negative correla-
tion between inequality and growth and that a relatively weak but suggestive support is found
for the opposite hypothesis.
Finally, the frequent rejection of random effects estimation that can be considered relatively
close to cross-section estimation should be regarded as evidence that the omitted variables
issue is of consideration and that valuable information is to be learned from single-country
time series analysis, when this type of data will become available. In the meantime country case
studies can be illuminating in unveiling the relationship between inequality and growth regard-




LIST OF COUNTRIES, NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS, AND PERIODS COVERED
* Periods are labeled based on the first year of the time period (for example 1990 indicates that the control
variables in the model belong to the period 1985-1990 and to the year that is closest to 1990, while the growth
rate covers the years 1990 to 1995)
Country  Obs.  Period *  Country  Obs.  Period * 
Australia 6  1965-1990  Korea  7  1960-1990 
Bangladesh 6  1965-1990  Malaysia  5  1970-1990 
Belgium 3  1980-1990  Mauritius  3  1980-1990 
Brazil 5  1970-1990  México  7  1960-1990 
Canada 6  1965-1990  Nepal  2  1980-1985 
Chile 3  1980-1990  Netherlands  4  1975-1990 
China 3  1980-1990  New  Zealand  2  1985-1990 
Colombia 6  1965-1990  Norway  6  1965-1990 
Costa Rica  5  1970-1990  Pakistan  3  1980-1990 
Dom. Rep.  2  1985-1990  Peru  7  1960-1990 
El Salvador  3  1960-1970  Philippines  3  1960-1970 
Finland 7  1960-1990  Portugal  2  1975-1980 
France 6  1960-1985  Sierra  Leone  2  1970-1975 
Greece 2  1975-1980  Singapore  5  1970-1990 
Guatemala 3  1980-1990  South  Africa  2  1960-1965 
Honduras 2  1985-1990  Spain  6  1965-1990 
Hong Kong  5  1970-1990  Sri Lanka  7  1960-1990 
Hungary 3  1980-1990  Sweden  6  1965-1990 
India 7  1960-1990  Thailand  6  1965-1990 
Indonesia 6  1965-1990  Trinidad  5  1960-1980 
Ireland 2  1975-1980  Tunisia  7  1960-1990 
Italy 4  1975-1990  Turkey  2  1970-1975 
Jamaica 2  1970-1975  UK 2  1985-1990 
Japan 7  1960-1990  USA  7  1960-1990 
Jordan 3  1980-1990  Venezuela  6  1965-1990 
Kenya 2  1975-1980  Zambia  2  1970-1975 
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